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WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW?
James F. Hogg
The words "international law" are
apt to draw a wry smile from the man in
the street-and our present involvement
in Vietnam merely gives more twist to
the smile which would have been there
before. To the layman, to the reader of
newspapers and reporters of interna·
tional events, intemationallaw conjures
up a mature legal system-one in which
an established legislature makes laws, an
executive carries them out, a judiciary
presides over trials of persons charged
with infractions of those laws, and a
sheriff stands ready to place a convicted
violator in jail and keep him there. The
layman knows that no such system or
its counterpart exists in the interna·
tional arena, controlling the relation·
ships between states. He is reminded
almost daily of the essentially lawless
behavior of certain states in the interna·
tional community, and accordingly (and
for this purpose this probably means
most of you in the audience) he comes
to think of international law as a lot of
words and academic concepts and argu·
ments unrelated to the realities of world
forces and power politics. He tends to
dismiss this material as having no signifi·
cant effect or impact, as providing no

significant assistance towards or guarantee of peace, or of a context in which
the individual states can go about the
business of government. He thinks of
international relations basically as a
function or problem in the exercise of
power, and in comparative power, with
spheres of particular interest or influence.
One of the objectives of this study is
to suggest to you that such a layman's
view may be somewhat out of focus,
and that military planning and strategy
demand an understanding and appreciation of the real strengths and utility of
international law as well as of its real
weaknesses and shortcomings.
But, as a preliminary step to embarking on any analysis of international law,
it is necessary to establish what it is not.
When we think of a legal system (and
the words "international law" suggest a
reference to such a system), we are
almost certain to borrow from the legal
system we know and project it as far as
possible into the next context. The
essential flaw in a layman's approach to
an appreciation of international law
frequently lies in such an extension. The
legal system we know constitutes the
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backbone of our society, and without it
none of us would have any security or
freedom of person or of property. Personal freedom would be meaningless
and property would be useless to us
without a system of protection and
vindication of our rights. The existence
of a mechanism for vindication presupposes a tribunal with authority to
adjudicate the existence and extent of
such rights as well as of a system for
enforcement of any rulings made by
such a tribunal. It usually is said that
the maturity of a society, and the rod
for measuring the progress made from
the primitive state, is found in its legal
system and its operational efficacy.
What comparable institutions currently
exist in the international arena?
There is no organization comparable
to the Congress having substantial legislative competence with right to pass
laws binding upon the individual states
of the world. And we are a long way
from the type of international consensus or common ground which would
constitute a necessary prerequisite for
the creation of any such organization.
Just ask yourselves how much agreement it would be possible to master
among states at the present time on
such an organization's authority to legislate on allocation of world resources
and materials, including water, distribution of population surpluses, and foodstuffs. The present chances of a significant number of states agreeing to confer
such legislative authority on an international organization must be slight indeed. The European Community, or
Common Market, represents a remarkable step in that direction taken by the
six West European states involved. But
the successes -as well as the .difficulties
of that union indicate the scope of the
problems confronting efforts to extend
further such a union.
How does the United Nations compare to an international legislature?
Some critics of our participation in the
United Nations have charged that our

membership in and adherence to that
organization amount to giving up national sovereignty and control in significant areas. Were that charge true, then
the United Nations might be, at the
present time, a form of international
legislature of limited authority-but it is
not. In ratifying the Charter of the
United Nations, we undertook to conform our conduct to the standards and
requirements of that landmark treaty,
but it does not commit us to acceptance
of binding decisions in significant areas
without our own future consent. The
authority of the General Assembly, at
least as illustrated by the 20 years of its
practice, is advisory rather than binding.
Actions such as the U.N. intervention in
the Congo might suggest a greater
authority, but reflection will suggest
that participation by the states supplying troops was dependent on their individual willingness to do so. In an advisory opinion in 1962, the International Court of Justice rules that other
members of the United Nations were
obliged to contribute their rated share
to the cost of such operations. Subsequent political decision in the Assembly, however, has undercut the judgment handed down by the Court; it
would seem that a political compromise
has been achieved falling short of adherence to any compulsory duty to
contribute in such a case.
The Security Council, on the other
hand, is provided with authority to
hand down binding rulings in certain
limited situations. On paper, this authority of the Security Council appears
to give it limited legislative competence.
In practice, the well-known veto power
insisted on by the Russians (and equally
essential to original participation by the
other great powers), reduces that binding authority to nearly zero so far as the
five powers with a veto are concerned.
For states other than the big five, it
might be thought that the Security
Council possesses significant legislative
authority. In fact, international disputes
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involve two or more parties-it usually
takes two to tango. This being the case,
the likelihood of both or all participants
finding a friend among the veto powers
is rather substantial.
For these reasons, in terms of a
realistic appraisal, we cannot regard the
United Nations as having significant
obligatory legislative authority. We are
parties to a variety of other treaties
which create organizations with special
limited authority to make binding rules.
But the limit of competence of these
organizations is specialized and narrow,
not touching the major issues of international peace.
Just as there is no real international
counterpart for Congress, so there is no
real international counterpart for our
courts or judicial and law enforcement
system. The International Court of
Justice is a unique institution. If I wish
to sue my neighbor because he damaged
my property, I can invoke the assistance
of a court without his consenting to be
sued by me in that court. This is not so
with the International Court. In suits
between individual states, the ICJ authority is dependent upon agreement by
both or all parties that the Court hear
the case. The Statute of the Court
makes provision for states to indicate in
advance of any particular dispute that
they accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court. Most such acceptances,
however, have been rather carefully
qualified by the states filing them. Thus,
in the celebrated Connolly amendment
to the United States declaration concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, it
is provided that the United States reserves the right itself to decide whether
certain types of suit are within or
outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
This gives us in many cases the ability to
decide, after suit has been brought,
whether we will allow it to continue.
Pretty smart, you say. Well, unfortunately, this means that if we wish to sue
any other country in that Court, it gets
the benefit of a similar veto over the

Court's jurisdiction. If the United States
is not prepared to make a more general
commitment to the authority of the
International Court, it goes without
saying that a number of other states are
prepared even less.
True, the International Court does
have another kind of jurisdiction: its
so-called advisory jurisdiction. The
General Assembly, the Security Council,
and certain other organs of the United
Nations can ask the Court for an
opinion on an allegedly hypothetical
question. The Court's opinion on
whether the Soviet Union and other
countries were obligated to contribute
towards the cost of the Middle East and
Congo operations came before the
Court under this authority. The opinion
given under such jurisdiction is advisory
in name as well as in political reality;
the organ requesting it is not bound to
follow it, nor are the individual states.
In sum, it is clear that in the international context not only is there no
substantial counterpart to the Congress,
but also there is no substantial counterpart to our judicial system. How then
can we speak of a subject called "international law"? Austin once defined law
as the command of a sovereign. By this
he meant that before you could have
law you must have a body with authority to make law or rules of conduct,
and, in addition, you must have the
machinery necessary to enforce those
rules when they are made. Clearly, in
the Austinian sense, we have no such
thing as international law_ What, then,
do we have, and why is it called
"international law"?
To work towards answers to these
questions, it is necessary to go back to
our domestic concept of a legal system.
We have laws prohibiting one person
from assaulting another or taking his
property by force. We have laws requiring automobiles to be driven according
to specified requirements. The existence
of these laws does not guarantee that
certain individuals will not break them
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and thereby expose themselves to prosecution. For most of us under most
circumstances, however, what is important in terms of the way we live our
everyday lives is that most people do
obey the requirements of these_ laws.
Most people do drive on the right side
of the road (with the notable exception
of the English) and most people do not
assault others or attempt to take their
property away by force_ If a significant
number of the people in this country
began to violate these laws steadily, our
system of order would break down,
notwithstanding the backup threat of
prosecution of the violators. Laws or
rules are significant in our daily lives,
therefore, because we safely can predict
that others will obey them, and we can
plan our own actions and lives on the
premise that they will be broadly
obeyed. For these reasons, one school
of thought defines law as a system of
rules and orders for the mutual benefit
of the members of society, which rules
and orders are generally followed and
obeyed. In this sense, we have a significant amount of international law but it
is of the utmost importance to hear in
mind that the reason why there is
habitual behavior consistent with the
rules is mutual benefit and not the
threat of a policeman or a sheriff. You
have the international rules of navigation-what would happen to navigation
of shipping without habitual observance
of those rules? If you think of international law as that body of custom and
experience which has grown up or
evolved from consideration of regulation required for the common benefit
and estimate the strength of any particular rule in any particular case in
terms of the reciprocal interest of the
other state or states in maintaining
adherence to that rule, you will come
closer to an understanding and appreciation of what international law means, to
what extent it can be relied upon, and
to what extent it must be taken into
account in planning action or strategy.

If, at the same time, you bear in mind
the old adage about the importance of
acting consistently, you will come even
closer. If the United States takes the
position today that the rule of conduct
in a particular situation is one thing, and
tomorrow takes an entirely different
and possibly inconsistent position from
that taken the day before, you can see
easily that other states are less likely to
be prepared to follow or accept either
yesterday's statement of the rule or
to day's statement of them. The importance of acting consistently, therefore, requires each state in any particular situation to think not only of the
immediate problem and what might be
done with it, but also to think of the
precedent (as lawyers call it) which any
particular action might create. In analyzing action in any particular situation,
it is most important to put ourselves in
the shoes of the other state or states
involved, and then ask how the particular rule we urge might be used by them
in another context. Let me give you an
illustration. If we claim that it is permissible to stop shipping on the high
seas to see whether arms are being
carried to the Viet Cong aboard the
vessels stopped, what happens if the
Russians claim to have a reciprocal right
to stop our shipping in the Caribbean
area to see whether it is carrying supplies usable by revolutionaries seeking
the overthrow of the Castro regime? It
is difficult obviously for us to assert a
right to stop and search shipping on the
high seas for particular purposes without according a similar right in similar
situations to other states. This element
in analysis we sometimes call mutuality
or reciprocity, and, if you stop to think
for a moment, you can see that a similar
concept underlies many of our own
everday dealings.
The importance and significance of
this element of reciprocity or mutuality
in international affairs is seen most
easily in the more mundane transactions
and events of everyday affairs. Suppose

39
that a U.S. corporation is thinking of
establishing a fairly large business in
Venezuela or Brazil, of building a factory, of establishing a stock of merchandise for sale and distribution from there
through other Latin-American countries. Among the things it must consider
are the following: Can it get permission
to come in? Will its personnel be
allowed to enter and leave the country
and travel freely? Will their lives and
safety be assured? Will the company's
capital investment be fairly protected?
And, nowadays, will a fair method of
taxation be used and applied both to
the corporation and its personnel by the
host state? American companies are
going abroad every day and setting up
such establishments precisely because
rather precise rules of international law
apply to regulate the rights and duties
of the corporation and the rights and
duties of the host country. The element
of mutuality and reciprocal interest for
the host country as well as for the
United States is clear.
What, then, is the source of international law which provides this measure
of assurance and predictability? If there
is no international legislature, where
does this law come from and how is its
content ascertained? The answer is from
at least two more or less distinct
sources: treaties or agreements entered
into between states, and the so-called
general, customary, or "common" international law.
Customary international law claims
to be a distillation of the experience of
states over at least the last 500 years. It
purports to have as its core or basis
those practices, those rules, which have
been observed and followed habitually
by states in their dealings with other
states. Now you will notice that in
talking about international law, I am
talking about a state dealing with another state. I am not talking about an
individual of one state dealing with an
individual of another state, and there is
a reason for this. International law says

(right or wrong and for whatever reason) that this whole body of learning
has to do with the relationships between
states, not between individuals. ThIS
approach is beginning to break down,
but at least the historical material emphasizes heavily, just as the International Court Statute emphasizes, that
the parties who are concerned with
international law are the states of this
world, not their individual citizens as
such.
Let me give you a couple of illustrations of rules of customary international
law. Castro broke one of them in
confiscating American property in
Cuba. There is a rule of general internationallaw which states that it is unlawful to take someone's property without
paying just compensation for it. There is
another standard which says (these are
generalizations, the rules are more
precise than this) that a state is required
to provide minimum acceptable levels of
protection for visiting aliens-not less
than national standards, and sometimes
more.
Now you may think this pretty
nebulous stuff: states change, governments change, and governmental attitudes to these rules doubtless change,
too. As a matter of fact, one of the
biggest problems at the present time is
that many of the new nations do not
think very highly of many of the standards established by the older nations,
primarily from western Europe. A considerable argument is going on concerning just how sound and how good
and how reliable for purposes of prediction some of these rules of international
law are. But one of the interesting
features of customary international law
is the flexibility that it has.
Now, as you know, many of the rules
of law which govern your everyday
lives-for instance, the law which
governs your protection against people
negligently injuring you-are general
rules not to be found in statutes at all.
They are found in the decisions of
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courts, built up into a consistent body
of practice through case-by-case adjudication. They are an important part of
our domestic legal system and provde
some analogy for customary internationallaw.
The second, and probably the far
more important source of international
law rules, is the treaties or agreements
which states make. The United States is
a party to some 6,000 treaties with the
other countries of the world. These
treaties, of which the U.N. Charter is
one, run the gamut from broad political
treaties, including military defense
agreements, through trade and commerce treaties, through tax agreements,
to agreements fixing the size and nature
of visiting military missions. Obviously,
these treaties are of greatly varying
importance to our national interest.
Less obviously, but equally clearly,
these treaties are negotiated and worded
with widely differing standards of precision and clarity of meaning. A treaty
establishing the appropriate taxing
power of the two countries party to it
can be expected to be drawn with
technical precision and detail. A political treaty expressing friendship between
two countries and suggesting that they
will take a common view and common
policy in matters of military action and
defense will use broad and nebulous
standards. And, if you have any question, look at the language of the SEATO
treaty and the statements there about
the circumstances under which one
party may come to the defense of
another.
In other words, some kinds of
treaties establish a relatively clear and
definite list of rights and duties for both
or all parties, and the statement leaves
little room for interpretation or difference of opinion about the scope and
extent of those rights and duties. Others
are deliberately framed in language so
general as in reality to create no rights
or duties.
Where, in this scale of things, does

the U.N. Charter fall? Article 51 of the
Charter provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security....
Our position in Vietnam is, in part,
premised on this article; we are engaging
in collective self-defense of the Republic
of Vietnam against external aggression.
But the Communist countries take a
different view of the meaning of this
article, as do some writers and speakers
in this country, including some of those
critical of our current policies. In the
event of disagreement over the meaning
of article 51, where do we go to find the
"true" meaning of the Charter? If you
and I sign a contract for the sale of my
house to you, and we disagree as to the
meaning of one of its terms, we go to
court to find out which of us is right. In
the absence of an International Court
with binding jurisdiction, where do we
go for an authoritative interpretation of
our treaty commitments? Are we forced
to the conclusion that our 6,000-odd
treaties and agreements are useless because there is no tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction to interpret and apply
them? Common sense suggests the
answer is no-otherwise, why would our
State Department so sedulously go
about negotiating new ones, like the
Test Ban Treaty?
Once again, the answer comes back
to practicalities and not theoretical
possibilities. In everyday international
life, states usually, and in fact almost
invariably, keep those treaty commitments of the kind which get framed
with some degree of precision. And the
reason is clearly one of mutual interest.
Cuba violated treaties as well as customary law in confiscating American
property interests without compen-
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sation. She is paying the price by
finding out how difficult it is for her
now to get development capital.
But it must be realized that as the
subject matter of a given treaty approaches more nearly to the vital interests of a country, so increases the
unwillingness of the country to make a
precise binding commitment for the
future, and so increases the danger of
any commitment receiving a forced interpretation to suit the particular tastes
of the interpreter. The degree of security, certainty and predictability
found in commercial matters between
states on friendly terms diminishes
sharply when the treaty is one between
less friendly states and involves more
vital interests or subject matter. Many
of the commitments set forth in the
U.N. Charter do involve vital national
interests. Accordingly, competing and
divergent interpretations frequently
are urged as to the nature and content
of those obligations. The issues creating
the problems of interpretation are more
apt to arise between relatively hostile
states or groups of states so that the
factors of mutuality and reciprocity are
likely to be minimized. Threats or acts
of reprisal by the Russians are unlikely
to influence our action or interpretation
of a particular Charter provision. The
quid pro quo or mutuality is here
hardest to see. In this context of divergent claims and interpretations of the
Charter, what good does law or legal
interpretation of the Charter as a treaty
do us? Does the Charter have any real
meaning, any real significance, if the
different protagonists can interpret it to
suit themselves?
Let me illustrate this problem. In
1956, an Emergency Force for the
Middle East was set up pursuant to U.N.
resolutions. In 1960, a somewhat similar
force was dispatched to the Congo
likewise pursuant to U.N. resolutions.
The Soviet Union refused to make any
contribution to the large costs of either
force as did a number of other U.N.

members. France refused to pay a nickel
towards the costs of the Congo opera·
tion. The U.S.S.R. gave as its reason
that these forces were constituted illegally, since only the Security Council
had authority to use force or direct the
use of force and only the Security
Council had authority to allocate any
consequent expenses. We advanced the
legal argument that article 17 of the
Charter gave the General Assembly the
necessary authority to, in effect, tax the
members to cover the costs of these
operations. Here, then, you had the
interesting situation of both the United
States and the Soviet Union earnestly
advancing and pressing detailed legal
arguments as to the meaning of the
charter. Why should either, why should
both have been concerned to advance
arguments of this sort? What did either
hope to gain or stand to gain? Eventually, the General Assembly, by majority
vote, requested the advisory opinion of
the International Court on this issue.
What was the supposed object of this
move? Who would stand to gain from
such an opinion, whichever way it
went? The Court finally decided by a
9-5 majority that our interpretation was
correct. Who, then, gained from this
decision? As far as I know, the Russians
still have to pay their first nickel
towards the costs of those operations.
In problems of this importance and
complexity, affecting vital national interests, the answer appears to be that a
complicated game of chess is being
played. Obviously, both sides feel that
something is to be gained by making as
persuasive an argument as possible; obviously, both feel that there is a market to
be persuaded; obviously, both see goals
or objects the attainment of which
merits investing in the best available
legal argument in order to maximize the
persuasiveness of their particular position. And, yet, this species of psychological warfare leaves the layman or
newspaper reader somewhat confused.
He clings tenaciously to the belief or
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hope that law, treaties, and the meaning
of treaty commitments are immutables
of fixed, definite, and precise meaning.
That hope or belief is just as false in the
international arena as it is in the domestic arena, as illustrated by some of the
landmark disputes of recent years which
tested the meaning of our own Constitution.
In the context of Vietnam, this
aspect of psychological warfare is being
played and played hard by both sides. It
is being played hard by forces of differing viewpoints right within this very
United States, as you all know. And so
you are apt to conclude: this is a
business for experts, for legal officers of
senior rank responsible for advising our
government and the President. What
does it have to do with the military
officer, even of most senior rank?
The answer to that question varies
through something like the same spectrum as treaties vary, as I suggested
earlier. Rather clearly, it is a matter of
interest but not of professional responsibility for the senior military officer to
be well informed about the legal basis of
our position in Vietnam. The Legal
Adviser to the State Department has
issued a lengthy paper on that subject
which may provide guidance. The military officer is entitled to rely on the
task being done well by that office. But
suppose that the question is: May I or
should I, as commanding officer of a
destroyer, intercept shipping on the
high seas destined, as I believe, for the
Viet Cong? Here, you may say, there is
another answer available to relieve the
commanding officer. Either the problem
may be covered by orders, issued from
above, or such orders may be obtained
quickly by single sideband. Once again,
someone with authority and legal experience will have considered the international law problems, if any, and will
have supplied adequate guidance for the
destroyer skipper. The large element of
truth in this last answer cannot be
denied. The problems of a commanding

officer which can be foreseen in advance
are fairly easily answered by preestablished orders or guidelines. Trouble is
apt to come, however, in those situations which have not been foreseen, or
are not covered in orders, or as to which
a measure of discretion (large or narrow) is left within the orders. In this
context, as in any other executive situation, the officer or person charged with
carrying out policy or orders must have
some substantial appreciation of the
policy underlying his orders in order to
be in a position to implement them as
well as possible. And the skipper here,
as in other situations, has little room for
error. As commander of a commissioned
naval vessel, his acts may engage directly
the responsibility of the United States
whether or not his actions are within or
beyond the scope of his orders. Failure
to act may be just as bad as acting too
vigorously, particularly in circumstances
in which, under Navy Regulations, he is
charged with the duty of protecting
American lives and commercial interests. But this, and other provisions of
Navy Regulations, would seem to require the skipper to be a "seaIawyer."
Confronted with what may seem an
impossible burden requiring legal skills
you have not received, you may throw
up your hands. You may regard these
regulations as a basis for charging a
scapegoat if the necessity for finding
one arises. There may be a scintilla of
truth in both these propositions. Certainly, no one imagines that you can be
given a serious foundation in the substantive content of international law in
the course of this seven-day study.
Former classes have experienced a
measure of frustration over this-some
have felt that the instructors and the
College have presented intemationallaw
as something which the officer is required, by appropriate regulations, to
have a working knowledge of, and yet
he cannot possibly obtain that knowledge from the brief time allotted to its
study. The consultants who have come
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for this program, in government service
and academics both, have invested a
goodly number of years in studying this
material You, as classes before you
have discovered, will find that they have
a great fondness for argument and little
comparable fondness for clear and
direct answers. Blame this on their legal
training and experience. But do not go
away thinking that the uncertainties,
the doubts, and the large scope for
argument make this subject a matter of
debate only. It is quite unrealistic to
suppose that, in the space of this short
study, you can become international
lawyers; and you should not be disconcerted when, at its end, you decide
that you have mastered little, if any, of
the substance of international law.
What you should derive from this
study is an introduction or background,
a viewpoint or perspective, of what
international law is all about, how it can
affect and does affect national policy,
the kinds of influence it can exert on
policy and strategy, and some feel for
the varying significance of international
law imputs in varying situations. As
background, this study is certain to be
of significance to future work you may
do in planning operations. Many of you,
in the near future (or indeed in the
immediate past), will be preparing
operational plans, and your choices or
alternatives and the reasons for chosing
between them well may be affected by
considerations of international law. In
short, you have been or will be responsible for initial preparation of the plans
which carry with them the instructions
to the skipper or other commander on
the line. Here, your interest in this

subject matter becomes much more
obvious and direct. Suppose, for
instance, that you had been assigned to
work on preparation of orders covering
Operation Market-Time. While you
would expect to go to JAG for help on
available international law, you would
still want to be in a position yourself to
appraise and orient the advice you
receive and correlate it to your operational plan.
Let me summarize for a moment.
The international law which you most
likely are to be concerned with in
planning is the body of material affecting rather vital national interests. This is
the material, within the broad field of
international h.w, which is most volatile
and relatively uncertain, in which approaches and attitudes may be more
important than knowledge of specific
treaty provisions or precedents from the
past, in which balanced consideration of
varying arguments may be required.
This aspect of international law does
contain great uncertainty, as well as
great capacity for flux and change. It is
worthwhile remembering that other
areas of international law, less closely
identified with basic national interest
and peace but fundamentally important
to everyday international exchange and
trade, are much more certain in their
content and much more reliable in state
conformity of conduct to those standards. Status-of-forces agreements, for
instance, are carried out every daymany of you will be familiar with some
of the details of cases involving members of a crew or other contingent
involved with local authorities in another country.
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